



3. Financial Supervision Architecture as Endogenous Variable:  a Political Delegation 
Approach  
 
The preceding Section made it manifestly evident that the quest for optimal financial supervision 
architecture cannot be pursued through a simple analysis of the costs and benefits expected from 
the possible alternative structures. If, in fact, one proposes to compare two counterpoised 
models—a Single Authority versus a system with Multiple Authorities—one realizes that each of 
them offers expected benefits but also expected risks. So a theoretical analysis of the potential 
effects of alternative supervisory structures does not take us very far. 
 
The first natural response to this problem would therefore be to estimate the real effects the two 
alternative supervisory models have on key economic variables. But this immediately fosters at 
least three orders of difficulty.  
 
Firstly, as we will show in the following  Sections, the emergence of a Single Authority is only the 
most striking aspect of a more general and gradual phenomenon: diversification, from country to 
country, in the degree of unification of financial supervisory power. What has occurred is that, 
compared to the traditional model of control by sectors, some countries have confirmed that 
model, other have radically changed it by adopting a Single Financial Authority, while others have 
taken or confirm intermediate choices. This raises the problem of measuring the degree of 
concentration of powers, country by country, in order to attempt the quantitative description of a 
qualitative phenomenon.  
 
Hence the first objective of the research agenda is to propose an indicator of this phenomenon to 
improve the descriptive analysis.  
 
Secondly, the issue of the optimal degree of concentration of financial supervisory powers has 
emerged only recently, with the reforms adopted in various countries, so considering the type of 
supervisory regime as an explicative or exogenous (though not unique) variable of any other 
economic phenomenon means undertaking an analysis of extremely short historical series, with all 
the related problems of interpretation. 
 
Thirdly, completely and satisfactorily identifying what the key economic variables are, and the 
most possible object of an estimate, on which a supervisory structure makes it effect felt, is not a 
simple problem. Alternative supervisory structures may, for example, affect the level of efficiency 
of the public resources invested in monitoring the financial markets. Indicators can be found for 
the efficiency phenomenon, and empirical analysis can therefore proceed.  
 
The point is that alternative structures may also (perhaps especially) affect other variables that are 
important but less easily expressed in concise indicators. Examples are stability38, reputation risk, 
or confident benefits, or the risk the authority will be captured by the policymakers or by the 
controlled intermediaries. 
 
Thus a quantitative search for the effects of alternative supervisory structures is probably 
premature39. It might be interesting, rather, to ask: are there any common determinants in the 
                                                 
38 On the elusive and ambiguous nature of the concept of financial stability from an empirical point of view see among 
others Garcia Herrero and del Rio (2003), Schoenmaker 2003, Grunbichler and Darlap (2003). 
39 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) empirically analyze the relationship between specific regulatory measures (capital 
ratios, deposit insurance, inspection rules, etc..), some bank performance indicators (asset growth, intermediation 
 8 
decision each country makes to maintain or reform its control structure? Finding a response would 
help us not only to interpret what has happened in the past but also to project scenarios of change 
for the future. 
 
Thus the second empirical objective of the research agenda is to attempt to concentrate on an 
analysis of the causes that have helped bring about a given supervisory structure, in one or more 
countries, so as to provided an econometric analysis.   
 
The approach we intend to follow here—extending the indication that the new political economy40 
has formulated in analyzing the definition of public policies—is to consider the supervisory 
structure with one or more authorities as an endogenous variable, determined in turn by the 
dynamics of other structural variables, economic and institutional, that can summarize and explain 
the political process that leads a country to maintain or reform its supervisory structure. 
 
A country confirms or reforms its supervisory structure when its policymakers decide it is 
advisable to do so. While we do not believe that policymakers are always and ever  benevolent 
dictators, nor do we wish to exclude this a priori, we can assume that these decisions are generally 
determined, in turn, by structural factors of a financial, economic and institutional nature. The 
search for these factors is a task for economic analysis. 
 
From the methodological standpoint41, the analogy with the abundant, consolidated literature on 
the independence of central banks may be of some interest, since, if we look closely, this issue is 
nothing more than the quest for an optimal  structure for the monetary agency. 
 
In this literature, the theoretical models produced no general, univocal result regarding the 
desirability of a structure with an independent central bank versus one with a dependant monetary 
authority. In fact, considering the industrialized countries, while the relationship between 
independence and control over inflation seemed sufficiently robust and convincing42, the 
relationship between independence, on the one hand, and fiscal and real variables43, on the other, 
was far from certain. Thus the theoretical cost-benefit analysis of alternative monetary regimes  
could not be considered conclusive. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
margin, costs, loan losses) and institutional indicators (corruption). The difference from the analysis described here is 
evident:  the object of analysis is the general design of the controls, not the individual rules of supervision. Above all, 
however, this work does not resolve the difficulties pointed out here: even individual supervisory measures have 
changed in various countries in recent years, so saying that all the data already fully reflect the effects of reforms is a 
rather bold statement; secondly, a complete judgment on the effects produced is not possible, since the set of 
performance indicators used is obviously partial. Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana and Yago (2002) examine the relationship 
between the structure, scope and independence of bank supervision and bank profitability; the results indicate a weak 
relationship, and – more importantly for our methodological remarks – the authors estimates using an alternative source 
of data failed to duplicate this result.  Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003) examine the impact of  bank 
regulations on bank interest margins and overhead costs; bank regulation however  become insignificant when 
controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, that represent structural 
institutional variables in our terminology. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2002) examine the impact of bank 
supervision on the financial obstacles faced by  corporation across 49 countries; the data are based on survey questions. 
Again our above remarks can be applied: here we have the perceptions by  specific economic agents of  the effects of  
supervision on specific set on indicators. 
40 For the new political economy approach see Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
41 For a recent and complete survey see Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2000).  
42 See  Cukierman (1994) Berger, de Haan and Ejffinger (2000). See also Alesina and Gatti (1995) 
43 See Cukierman (1992). 
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We then went on to verify the theoretical conjectures with comparative, institutional and empirical 
analysis. After constructing indices of independence of the central banks44, and having historical 
alternative models of independent and dependent monetary authorities45, we attempted to 
determine whether the degree of legal independence could be considered an independent variable 
in explaining important macroeconomic phenomena: inflation, deficits and public debt, income 
and growth46.  
 
But above all, still on the methodological plane, the next step forward in the research was to 
endogenize the degree of central bank independence47, in order to identify what economic and/or 
institutional structures could explain the decision of one or more countries to maintain or reform 
their monetary regimes, i.e. the degree of independence of their central banks.  
 
The studies on endogenization of the degree of central bank independence were both theoretical 
and empirical and helped explain under what conditions a given country might decide to reform 
the institutional structure of its central bank, to modify its degree of independence.  
 
Various interpretative hypotheses were advanced to explain the genesis of the political process that 
leads a monetary regime to assume given characteristics.  Development in endogenizing central 
bank independence – or its effectiveness - has been the subject of analysis in both economics and 
political science. Some48 revealed the possibility that the degree of central bank independence 
depends on the degree to which constituencies strongly averse to inflation are present, especially 
within the financial community, as political interest group, which drives policymakers to bolster 
the status of the central bank (financial interest group); others49 have stressed that the features of 
the legislative and/or political system  can influence policymakers to decide whether to have a 
structure of monetary powers with an independent central bank (political interest group) 50; others 
have pointed out that the policymakers may have a specific interest in establishing an independent 
central bank in their country, for reasons linked to political stability51 or international credibility52 
                                                 
44 After the seminal central bank independence indices published  by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), followed 
by Cukierman  indicators (1992), different indicators were proposed; for a discussion see  Berger, de Haan and 
Eijffinger, (2000).  
45 See Toniolo (1988).  
46 See Alesina and Summer (1993), Cukierman (1994) and Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2000). 
47 See Masciandaro (1995) and Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2000); note the difference between  institutional setting 
endogeneity and inflationary bias endogeneity.  
48 Maxfield (1994). Posen (1995), noting that there are distributive consequences in the choices of monetary regimes, 
stated that there is no reason to assume that the adoption of central bank independence is self-enforcing; that choice 
requires political support, and the financial sector is positioned to provide that support.  De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) 
raised doubts about Posen’s theory. On the relationships between financial sector preferences, low inflation and central 
bank independence see also van Lelyveld (2000). 
49 Moser (1999) 
50 Cukierman (1994); however his predictions are tested and rejected by Cukiermann and Webb (1995) and by De Haan 
and Van’t Hag (1995). Vaubel (1997) suggests that central banks, even if formally independent, can be captured; Sieg 
(1997) proposes a formal model of a captured independent central bank. Bernhard (1998) claims that information 
asymmetries of the monetary policy process can create conflicts between government ministers, their backbench 
legislators and, in multiparty government, their coalition partners; an independent central bank can help overcome these 
conflicts. Goodman (1991) argues that conservative government with expected short tenure will adopt an independent 
central bank to limits the ability of future government; see also Milesi- Ferretti (1995). On the relationship between 
government partisanship and central bank structure see Alesina (1989), Alesina and Sachs (1988). Moser (1999) 
analyses  the relationship  between  the central bank independence and the features (checks and balances) of the 
legislative systems; Keefer and Stasavage (2001) introduce a theoretical model and empirical evidence on this issue. 
51 Bagheri and Habibi (1998).  De Haan and Van’t Hag (1995) test the hyphotesis that government planning to incur 
higher deficits may wish to increase credibility  granting more central bank independence; no supporting evidence is 
found. The importance of central bank law design for the central bankers is clearly claimed in Poole (2003). 
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(specific public interest); others53 have stressed the role of the culture and of the tradition of 
monetary stability in a country or the importance of  the citizen preferences54 (general public 
interest). 
  
It is evident that studies of this type acquire great importance, especially in periods when there is a 
tendency to reform or at least to question the design of the rules. And while in the past this was the 
case with analyses of central bank independence, it now applies for the first time to the debate on 
authorities in the financial field. In fact to the best of our knowledge no studies examine the 
relationships between politics and financial supervisory architecture55. 
 
In conclusion, regarding the issue of financial supervisory models, there are obvious analogies of 
approach with the debate on central bank independence, as well as one principal difference: in our 
case, we are "forced" to skip the first phase -  exogeneity -  and attempt the endogeneity approach 
directly.  
 
Finally, the endogenization of the policymaker's choice of the optimal level of concentration in the 
supervisory architecture will be more effective, however, if analyzed as a problem of delegation, 
through a principal–agent approach. Principal-agent models have found interesting applications in 
the area of monetary policy studies56: it is in the interest of the policymaker (the principal) to 
delegate the conduct of anti- inflationary monetary policy to an independent central bank (the 
agent), because this makes that policy more effective. 
 
The principal–agent approach can also be applied to the problem being examined here, even though 
the degree of complexity is rather greater.  
 
The first step is to explain which objective (What?) the policymaker intends to pursue in delegating 
the supervisory policy over the banking, financial and insurance system. The second step is to 
analyze the policymaker wishes (Why?) to delegate this policy rather than implement it directly, 
and whether his choices are motivated by general interests or are captive to specific interests57. The 
third step is to ask how many institutions the policymaker delegates this policy to (How many?) 
and, step four, which institution(s) he utilizes (Who?). What we are proposing here is a political 
delegation approach58 in dealing with the financial supervisory architecture issues. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
52 Maxfield (1997). 
53 Berger (1997), Berger and de Haan (1997). Hayo (1998) claim that people’s preferences with respect to price stability 
matter in explaining low inflation rate, and that the central bank independence is just one aspect of a stability regime, 
with two competing interpretation on the role of  the institutional design: preference – instrument interpretation versus 
historical-feedback interpretation. Franzese (1999) claims that the effectiveness of central bank independence depends 
on every variable in the broader political – economic environment.  
54 Eggertsson and Le Borgne (2003). 
55 In general, there are few recent examples of studies on   politics and banking ;for a survey see Pagano and Volpin 
(2001). 
56 For a survey  see  Masciandaro (1995), Berger, de Haan and Eijffinger (2000). 
57See Stigler (1971), Laffont and Tirole (1991).  For a Stiglerian view of bank regulation see Heinemann and Schuler 
(2003). 
58 A  recent paper – Alesina and Tabellini (2003) – proposed a general model in order to investigate the criteria that 
should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. The 
delegation approach to the monetary policy analysis has been proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995), 
Svensson (1997), Fratianni, Von Hagen and Waller (1998), in order to solve the inflation bias stemming from a 
dynamic inconsistent problem. Eggertsson and Le Borgne (2003)  proposed a model to explain why, and under what 
circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegate policy tasks to an independent agency, applying this theory to the 
monetary policy. 
